All For One and Each to Their Own

The notion that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is long established but often misguided and can create a false sense of shared interest, power dynamics and underlying realities.  UK universities appear to be united in defending themselves against perceived threats from Government action, media criticism and public opinion/apathy.  But loose coalitions of convenience and an unspoken agreement not to criticize each other publicly are unlikely to be enough to either win the day or manage the important business of shaping the sector for the future.

It is equally clear that the financial circumstances faced by individual institutions cannot simply be conflated as a problem driven by visa policy, domestic student fees or Government rhetoric.  A first step towards the future is to accept that some institutions face serious problems in even attracting sufficient numbers of students, and may need radical solutions.  Another might be to acknowledge that some university management doesn’t understand forecasting, the markets, competition and/or travelled too hopefully for too long, as the University of East Anglia appears to have done when acknowledging “for the third year running we fell short of our student recruitment targets in the home undergraduate student market”.

It would be sensible to look at what has happened to the money injected because of the benevolent international student environment announced in 2019 and whether the pace of recruitment was appropriate in terms of student experience, local services and public opinion.  Some universities appear to have built a significant cash pile which may help ameliorate any short-term falls in recruitment and others have chosen to invest the bounty in other ways.  Whether those investments were wise, sustainable or designed to maintain/increase domestic student recruitment through, say, a financial subsidy from increased international student recruitment requires a more detailed study.

This blog takes a relatively narrow look at two universities that might appear to have similar opportunities as part of a mission group of “world class research intensive universities”.  Using data that reflect 2022/23 international recruitment and tuition fee data rather than waiting for HESA to catch up, it suggests that one has problems pre-dating recent changes to the visa regime.  The differential performance in international recruitment demonstrates that even when recruitment conditions are benevolent the market makes choices to the benefit of some universities and the detriment of others.       

Hold Your Friends Close..

The current unity of the sector is shallow and self-interested and the UniversitiesUK claim of “142 universities One voice” is wide of the mark.  We have the Russell Group, University Alliance, MillionPlus, GuildHE, and Cathedrals Group, but saw the 1994 Group disband in 2013, shortly after several of its number jumped ship to the Russell Group. Any solutions to the sector’s funding problems needs to be even more granular and consider specific issues.

Even though the Russell Group has become the de facto face of higher education for the media and many politicians it is far from a unified and equal group of partners.  Colleagues are familiar with my description of a meeting of its 24 members as having the sophisticated six acting cool and sipping martinis in the corner while the regional city types lumber around drinking craft beer and showing off.  Members from outside England hang around the fringes trying to attract attention by channeling a moody, Celtic-fringe vibe and the remaining half a dozen wonder why they paid the cab fare to attend when nobody really wants to talk to them.

…And Your Enemies Closer

HESA data delays mean it is difficult to get a full picture of the most recent enrollment success or otherwise of Russell Group universities.  What was clear in the immediate period after changes to post-study work visas and up to 2020/21, was that there was a strong focus on Chinese students but with some notable names failing to keep pace.  At the recent PIE Live Europe event a University of Glasgow spokesperson indicated that the most recent intake (presumably 2023/24) was “last year we had one of our strongest undergraduate performing years” despite it being the first time in a decade the university had not hit or exceeded its targets    

Sympathy should be tempered, for a number of reasons.  Firstly, universities have something of a habit of inflating enrollment targets in the good times so missing them might simply be a result of hubris in setting objectives.  More importantly, the University’s “Overseas Students” income rose by 10 % (£27.6m) to £303.8m from 2021/22 to 2022/23 and is up a whopping £166.5m since 2019.  While conscious that finance can be a tricky business the measures on operating surplus and net cash seem to support the Director of Finance’s view that they can “continue to develop,
invest and deliver on our strategic plans enabled by strong financial results.”

 Source: University of Glasgow Reports and Financial Statement 

But, as a reminder that the Russell Group university experience is very mixed, the University of York, reported in January 2024 a £24m deficit partly because “International student numbers decreased in the year following high recruitment after the Covid pandemic and reflecting changed geopolitical circumstances.”  It might be equally plausible that the moody, Celtic-fringe types from Glasgow, along with other Russell Group members, stole genteel York’s lunch money by competing more effectively for Chinese and other students. 

We will know more when the long-awaited HESA 2022/23 data emerges but the UCAS end of cycle data does give a sector wide insight into what happened at undergraduate intake level in 2022/23 and we can see that the fortunes of the two differed dramatically.  Glasgow has consistently grown non UK/EU applicants since 2018/19 and after a sharp hike in 2019/2020 has maintained the number of applicants accepted.  York saw a small decline in applicants and a much larger decline in applicants accepted from 2021/22 to 2022/23.  It may simply be that faced with Russell Group options international students are choosing the biggest name, best ranked or most competitively marketed.

This hypothesis might be supported by the fact that the University of York appears to have been forced to take more non-mainstream international applicants to even reach a declining total of acceptances.  The University of Glasgow has been able do exactly the opposite and secure increasing numbers of students through the mainstream route. Mainstream applicants apply through UCAS before the main deadline of 30 June and can nominate up to five institutions to consider their application.  

One interesting feature that does combine the two universities is that Kaplan is the operator of the International College for both.  In this respect the University of Glasgow annual report for 2022/23 notes that its “excellent..financial results” were achieved despite “..a decrease of £3.7m in partnership income from Glasgow International College Kaplan” and the annual report of the University of York International Pathway College LLP shows a that Operating Profit declined from £2m to £900k in the year to July 2022/23.  The University of Glasgow Pathway College entity has a different financial year end so it is not possible to provide a direct comparison.

The University of Glasgow appears to be slightly more expensive than the University of York for international students and the entry grades seem reasonably equivalent.  The apparent inability of York to compete effectively for international students despite this may be one reason for the January 2024 report that the University of York was “lowering admission requirements for some international students in light of “financial challenges.”  They may still find that the market votes with its feet.

Winter Is Coming

Sometimes the higher education sector can seem like a retread of Game of Thrones including “..several noble houses..a complicated, multiparty war…shifting conflicts, alliances, and betrayals.”  Driven by expediency many of the protagonists join together in a final battle to defeat the Night King and the White Walkers but in the end the Iron Throne is melted and the system governing Westeros is radically altered.  The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) review may be the sector’s Drogon or simply signal that winter is coming.

What will remain true is that the sector is not a monolithic entity and it is unhelpful to position it as such.  The main beneficiaries of the recent years of the graduate route are characterized by MAC’s Annual Report 2023 as universities “..that charge the lowest fees” and is “..strongest at the less selective universities.”   The report also highlights the University of Hertfordshire and the University of Glasgow as having the largest increase in international student numbers between 2018/19 and 2021/22 but it is clear that their success was for different reasons in different markets.

There is more to be said on the patchwork nature of the university sector as well as on the emerging evidence of slow recovery for commercial pathway operators.  That will be the subject of a follow up blog when time allows. 

Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay

Up To Data

In the blog International Enrolments Unchained from February 2023 the UK universities with the most growth from India, Nigeria and Pakistan between 2020/21 and 2021/22 were shown. In the continuing absence of anything from HESA telling us what happened next and after the rather jaded retreading of old enrollment numbers by IHEC it seemed worth having a look at what happened to one of those players and also taking a look at one of the universities bemoaning its failure to keep up.


It’s good old-fashioned grunt work but lots of the data is there if you are prepared to put in the effort. It’s also revealing about the way some institutions have chosen to stash the cash and shown interesting movements in recruitment of domestic students. The picture is not comprehensive but it’s a sight better and more useful than sitting back and reporting on numbers from the middle of the pandemic.

This blog focuses on two institutions with quite different backgrounds and fortunes. The good news is that they give some real insights into what happened to their international student numbers in 2022/23. As these are formal Annual/Strategic Reports and Financial Statements it is difficult to see why that information cannot be entered into a common database and published within months of the financial year end or, on a preliminary basis, even earlier. Higher education may not like being accused of being outdated but the melting glaciers are beginning to outpace its rate of change – which is sad all round.

University of Hertfordshire

University of Hertfordshire (UoH) international student growth from 2020/21 to 2021/22 was pretty startling and they are not shy about highlighting their continued reaping of the Graduate Visa harvest. Overall, the UoH international community grew to 15,730 (45.4%) of a student body of 34,670. The numbers from India, Nigeria and Pakistan grew by 73.5%, 192.8% and 151.9% respectively although it is interesting to see the tailing off of numbers from Pakistan.

Source: University of Hertfordshire Strategic Reports and Financial Statements

The impact on UoH finances has been startling. Total full-time tuition fees have risen by 55.4% in the four years since 2019/20 with full time international tuition fees rising by 285.9% over the period. Despite the international fee bounty the University appears to have reduced its home student intake in 2021/22 and 2022/23 – this is implied because the domestic fee hasn’t changed but the amount collected is down. If one of the reasons for supporting greater international fee income is that it genuinely protects home student places this is probably worth a more detailed look.

Source: University of Hertfordshire Strategic Reports and Financial Statements

Rather than investing in home student recruitment it appears that UoH has been stashing most of the money away for largely unspecified purposes and spending it on largely unexplained “other operating expenses”. While staff costs rose by £20.5m between 2019/20 and 2022/23 the Other Operating Expenses (which do not have any accompanying note in the financial statement) rose £62.6m. There may be good reasons but it would be a comfort to have them spelt out.


Staff costs and numbers reported suggest investment in Academic and Research staff with their numbers growing over the period by 146 compared to all other staff growing by only 41. This is not always the case when universities find themselves flush with cash and it will be interesting to see how UoH deals with any decline in international student revenue.

Source: University of Hertfordshire Strategic Reports and Financial Statements

The Annual Report shows that the main impact of the financial windfall is that Cash reserves have gone from around £100m in 2019/20 to about £170m in 2022/23. The Operating Surplus has increased from about £2m to £20m and borrowings have declined. It looks as if UoH may have been preparing itself for a less certain future and may be reasonable well set to weather any headwinds.

Source: University of Hertfordshire Strategic Reports and Financial Statements

In that respect and just as a thought experiment it is worth considering that if UoH lost 50% of its international student income gained from 2021/22 to 2022/23 this would amount to around £22m. Even at this level the overall fee income is very considerably higher than 2019/20 and there is a substantial cash buffer to manage changes to a smaller scale operation. One suspects that their approach to management will see trimming of budgets and caution rather than them travelling hopefully on recruitment.


University of York


The University of York (UoY) has had a quite different experience. In January 2024 it was reported as “lowering admission requirements for some international students in light of “financial challenges.”” A reported £24m deficit was, they indicated, partly because, “International student numbers decreased in the year following high recruitment after the Covid pandemic and reflecting changed geopolitical circumstances.” It seems more likely that they had their lunch eaten by Russell Group competitors.


Their summary of student enrollments over the four years from 2019/20 to 2022/23 show a sharp spike with 59% growth in enrollments then a fall of 15.6% in 2022/23. They are not quite as forthcoming on the origin of their international students as UoH so we need to look at HESA’s slightly more dated data to get some insight into what might have happened.

Source: University of York Annual Report and Financial Statements

The HESA data (which gives slightly different numbers to those from the UoY reports but are close enough to be relevant) shows us that the growth from 2019/20 to 2021/22 was driven almost entirely by Chinese PGT students with a healthy boost from Chinese UG between 2019/20 and 2020/21. It is notable that UoY also managed a decent upward bump in students from India in 2021/22 which made up for a small decline in Chinese PGT enrollment that year.


The point is that their growth relied almost entirely on Chinese students. We know from HESA that between 2020/21 and 2021/22 the total number of enrolled FT Chinese students in the UK actually rose – from 140,445 to 148,760 – and that the FT PGT number grew from 72,555 to 77,135. It seems likely that UoY simply couldn’t compete against others in the Russell Group (the International Enrolments Unchained blog also looks at this issue) and it will be interesting to see if the 2022/23 numbers from HESA due to be published in April 2024 support this notion.

Source: HESA

The financial impact of the changes is clear. International FT student fee income rose by 67.5% over two years to 2021/22 (home student FT fees rose 10.6%) and dipped back slightly in 2022/23 (with home FT fees stable). The graphs show a relatively stable picture on staff costs (with USS movements excluded) until a spike in 2022/23.

Source: University of York Annual Report and Financial Statements

The staffing picture is notable for the relative suppression of Support Staff FTE during the pandemic but a significant leap in 2022/23. Over the four years the number of Support Staff has increased by 333 compared to Academic Staff up by 285 over the same period.

Source: University of York Annual Report and Financial Statements

Summary

A number of thoughts come to mind:

  1. While the change in visa regime will have an impact it seems likely that some UK institutions are significantly financially better off because of the extent to which they took advantage of the changes in post-study work. It is plausible that even a 50% reduction on the financial gains from 2021/22 to 2022/23 is far from catastrophic and particularly so if the institution is nimble enough to cut back to reflect changing circumstances.
  2. While universities like UoH who exploited these markets effectively can seem vulnerable to large declines in application volumes it is also likely that their on the ground operations will be more effective in taking larger share of declining markets.
  3. Universities that were unwilling or unable to capitalise on student markets that grew strongly because of changes to post-study work are likely to have been vulnerable to more powerful competition taking greater market share in China. Maybe some of the larger Russell Group universities have a secret persona as playground toughs who rough up less famous peers and take their lunch money.
  4. It will be interesting to see how the pathway operations involved have fared over these years. UoY’s relationship with Kaplan is likely to have supported them in the earlier years reviewed but may not have been able to overcome the lure of the bigger brand names.
  5. It would be sensible for an incoming Government to get more granular with the way different institutions are responding to changing market conditions. There is a certain logic to allowing the most dynamic and strongest to thrive, as long as academic standards and appropriate visa handling is in place, rather than introducing arbitrary caps on numbers.
  6. If international student fee income is, as has been argued, a protection for maintaining or growing domestic student places there needs to be some consideration of how direct the correlation is. From the UoH example above it appears that the university has been effective in securing significant increases in international income but has reduced enrollment of domestic students.

Image by Micha from Pixabay