Canadian HE Pathways – An Open then Shut Case?

The recently announced ten-year contract between Ryerson University and Navitas raises questions about the fate of pathway discussions with the University of Western Ontario (commonly known as Western).  The interest of both universities may also be indicative of emerging financial pressures that could make Canada a land of opportunity for pathway operators. But some recent closures suggest it’s not always going to be plain sailing in “the True North strong and free”.

Even before the pandemic, there was increasing pressure on university budgets in Ontario, Alberta and Manitoba.  Alberta plans to reduce post-secondary institution funding by 20 percent over three years and Ontario plans to make up to 60 per cent of funding tied to performance-based metrics over time.  This has echoes of the State budgetary cuts that forced many public US universities to consider, and in some cases work with, commercial pathway operations.

But there is evidence that even in Canada pathways groups will have to pick their partners wisely to achieve sustainability. Study Group’s partnerships with Stenberg College and the Center for Arts and Technology were announced in February 2019 but will not be admitting students after the Fall 2020 intake. They do not seem to have flourished despite Canada’s general popularity with globally mobile students.

Western May Need “Urgent Assistance” To Recruit  

For anyone who thought that life was good for the university sector in Canada the specter of budget cuts and performance-based metrics may come with a touch of schadenfreude. There seems little doubt that Western has had to take the matter seriously and that its achievements in attracting international student interest have been limited. Fortunately for those who are interested the debate in the university is played out largely in public documents.

At Western’s March 2020 Senate meeting the President, when asked when the Navitas proposal might come to Senate, “indicated the timeline had not yet been determined. If the University needs urgent assistance to recruit students that could impact the timing of the proposal.” Western’s international enrollment has been patchy with their 2018-19 their international first year undergraduate intake being 855 compared to 508 in 2015-16 but then dropping back to 639 in 2019-20.  Perhaps more troubling in terms of concentration was that 75% of the 2019-20 intake was from China.

A potential block to any deal was the reminder that, “Senate notes that the potential partnership with Navitas involves the academic work of the University, which explicitly falls under the remit of Senate in the UWO Act; and therefore the articulation agreement/partnership/credit transfer/affiliation agreement/ contract to engage in the academic work of Western must come to Senate for approval.” In the manner of university turf-wars a representative of the Operations/Agenda Committee then noted “that it would support details relating to the academic components progressing to Senate, with the financial arrangements not being within Senate’s remit.” 

For those who enjoy the knockabout nature of university meetings the minutes are well worth a read and particularly so at S.20-59 where Question 2 noted that Navitas had agreements with Simon Fraser University and the University of Manitoba.  The discomfort was evident, “should Western proceed with a partnership with Navitas when two and possibly three other Canadian universities have such partnerships (which will make us one of four Canadian universities for which those vaunted Navitas recruiters are recruiting, so not obviously set apart from the other Canadian universities)”.

Sadly, and perhaps because of the pandemic, no further Senate meetings have been reported this year so it is difficult to say whether discussions went any further.  But Exhibit IV, Appendix 4 of the February Senate Agenda outlines the enrollment background and the shape of the Navitas deal being proposed. It’s also worth noting that Ryerson might have insisted that Navitas do not engage another Ontario partner in the near future so Navitas’s loss could be someone else’s gain.

The Bigger Picture and the Potential Trap

Anyone following developments in Canada will have seen the explosive growth in international student enrollments.  That has been tracked by the desire of pathway operators to find a way into the market, and Navitas appears to have got a small edge.  But the Ryerson deal and Western’s apparent need or willingness to engage may suggest we are seeing the thin end of a wedge that will see more Canadian universities joining with commercial partners to drive their international growth.

Movement in recent years has largely been in what may be considered secondary brands and non-degree bearing institutions. A recent announcement saw GUS expanding its Canadian network with the Trebas Institute but the Study Group experience noted above is a cautionary tale. Perhaps this is a good moment for all investors to pause and consider the history of pathways in North America.

Some believe, along with Marx, that history happens the “first time as tragedy, the second as farce”.  The United States was considered the El Dorado of pathway opportunities for several year with over a $1bn of private money flowing into expansion and start-ups.  The recent, rapid decline of pathway numbers, with more than ten closing in the past year, suggests that there is virtue in considering how to position yourself to be sustainable over the longer-term.

However, a resurgent United States could rapidly reassert its dominant position over Canada in terms of attractiveness to international students.  It would not take much for a loosening of visa constraints, an improvement in post-study work availability and a more welcoming administration to turn things around.   It is a reasonable bet that the change in post-study work opportunities in the UK has already slightly dampened interest in Canada as a destination.

Seasoned observers of international student mobility know that what goes round tends to come round.  Just as the step back taken by Australia and the UK in the early 2010s helped fuel growth in the US it seems reasonable to believe that the current US situation is helping to drive interest in Canada and the UK.  Quality universities will always recruit best under difficult conditions, so the right answer is to build a portfolio of decent brands and acknowledged specialist institutions while having a fall-back position for students who don’t meet those standards.

Image by Clker-Free-Vector-Images from Pixabay

US PATHWAY SECTOR FACES DOUBLE WHAMMY UNDER ENROLLMENT PRESSURE

It appears that the cull of pathway operations in the US has further to go. The Navitas website suggests that Global Student Success Programs at UMass Lowell, UMass Dartmouth and Florida Atlantic University have been discontinued.  All of them throw up the message, “The Global Student Success Program is no longer accepting new applications..” * It’s the same story for Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Idaho links.

Looking more deeply, the figures from UMass Lowell show a precipitous drop in Navitas enrollments from 187 in Fall 2016 to just 81 in Fall 2018.  The numbers for 2019 aren’t available on the university site but a further dip seems likely.  If these are permanent closures it brings Navitas down to three pathways in US from eight at its peak.  Overall, the number of on-campus pathways in the US may have fallen to around 40 and its little wonder some are making a “pandemic sales pitch” that they are really masters of online technology.

With the pressure on US international enrollments growing year by year it’s difficult to see that there is a lot of good news to come.  Rumours abound and are difficult to verify but in recent weeks I’ve been told of a pathway run by one of the big two operators at a top 200 east coast university that is looking at a 70% decline in enrollments year on year.  It’s a very long way from the suggestion made in 2014 by Parthenon Group partner Karan Khemka, that “We anticipate that growth will be constrained only by the pace at which private providers can develop the market.”

We are seeing a wholesale realignment of the pathway sector but alongside that there may also be a double whammy as universities seek to renegotiate commercial terms in the light of changing market conditions.  For example, the University of South Carolina Board of Trustee minutes from April 2019 make for interesting reading as they reflect on the changing nature of the university’s deal with Shorelight.  The initial deal had been signed for seven years in 2015 and the proposal was to re-sign for another seven but with “better financial terms for the University”.

One big shift indicated was that USC would be allowed to keep 90% of the tuition paid by students in years following the pathway and pay Shorelight 10% of the tuition.  Under the initial agreement the split was 83% to USC and 17% to Shorelight, so on an out of state, undergraduate student fee of $16,700 that’s a cut of just over $1,100 a year per student.  It’s worth remembering that Shorelight noted early in their history that, “not only does the university not contribute anything upfront to get the program off the ground…but Shorelight reimburses the university for any expenses as it’s getting off the ground.”

The obvious question for traditional pathways is how they remain sustainable when the university is bearing none of the start up costs, and if the provider’s revenue share from students going into the university is being reduced.  In a recent blog I looked at the growing inter-company debt between INTO University Partnerships and its US pathways where, the collective debt owed by five joint ventures open for at least five years, had from under $5m to nearly $15m. The closure of the pathway at INTO’s partner Marshall University came as enrollments fell and inter-company debt rose sharply.

While $1100 a student doesn’t sound very much the real point is that this becomes a loss of $110,000 a year if you have 100 students progressing and $330,000 over the lifetime of the cohort. Add to that the increasing cost of acquisition of each student as global competition increases and the basic economics of a pathway come under serious pressure.

It also raises the question as to how sustainable are the remaining pathway operations as the US faces another bleak year for international enrollment.  A recent Open Doors survey reported 52% of US universities indicating a decline in enrollments for 2020.  Navitas research with agents recently suggested that declining student mobility and growing unpopularity could see the US lose between 160,000 and 350,000 international students.

Alongside the well-known and longer-term internal issues facing students who might previously have seen the US as their preferred option there is little doubt that competition is playing an increasingly important role.  The UK has made good headway and become a more popular destination this year which has led to an increase in undergraduate enrollment from China of 14% this year.  Canada continues to provide an attractive option with clear routes to citizenship that have been particularly successful in attracting Indian students in recent years.

Supply and demand are powerful and remorseless market disciplinarians.  The dash for growth in the US pathways came supported by over $1bn of private money flowing into the sector, but the economics of creating more and more supply at a point when demand was slowing have become evident.  With global competition for students increasing, student mobility threatened and universities finding alternative means of reaching the market – particularly online – it’s probably a hard road ahead.  

*As always I am happy to have authoritative corrections or clarifications and will record them.

Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay