Like most fledgling businesses, INTO University Partnerships (INTO) had some difficult moments in its early years. In March 2008, Austin Mitchell MP raised the matter in a Parliamentary question why it had not filed financial records with Companies House and founder Andrew Colin said that the delay in submitting accounts was a “simple mistake.” It’s not the sort of mistake you expect a £119m revenue company to be making 14 years later, so the apparent failure to file accounts on time for the joint venture with the University of East Anglia (INTO UEA llp) seems a reasonable moment for considering other possible reasons.
Companies House confirmed on 4 August that, “Upon checking the company record I can confirm that the LLP’s accounts for the period ending 31/07/2021 have not yet been received for filing at Companies House.” This blog speculates without knowing the detail behind the late filing and it may turn out to be simply a matter of administrative failure. Time will tell and I would be happy to provide an update if anyone with appropriate authority from the company or university contacts me with a plausible explanation.
At one end of the spectrum the failure may simply be down to bad planning and Companies House list fines starting at £150 for being a month late to £1500 for being six months over the filing deadline. They do go on to say that “Not filing your confirmation statements, annual returns or accounts is a criminal offence – and directors or LLP designated members could be personally fined in the criminal courts.” One would guess that it’s unlikely to get that far.
The delay does, however, raise the possibility that INTO and the University of East Anglia are in discussions about the future of the joint venture and are delaying the filing until a direction is clear. It would require someone with appropriate accounting/auditing qualifications (which I don’t have) to fully explain the complexities of what needs to be declared in terms of timing (from balance sheet date to authorization for issue) and whether events are adjusting or non-adjusting. Change would not, however, be unprecedented because recent history has seen INTO become 51% owners and take “significant control” of INTO Newcastle University LLP and new profit/loss sharing arrangements at INTO City LLP were noted in the 2020 accounts.
Slip Sliding Away
A previous blog noted the trajectory of INTO UEA’s student enrollments and the slide in the university’s international tuition fee revenue. The parlous state of affairs at the joint venture was confirmed with the statement that there “will be no distribution in respect of 2020/21 nor for the next three years whilst the joint venture recovers and builds up surpluses for distribution.” All that alongside a £7m loan guaranteed equally by both partners might be drivers of a discussion about the future.
The University’s Council meeting in October 2021 was advised by the Vice Chancellor that at that point it was falling short of recruitment targets by c1,000 students. This might suggest that international enrollments were also not picking up and the feed through from the joint venture was not as hoped. It all seems good fodder for the Council member who requested at the Council meeting the following month an executive summary of “what was keeping the VC awake at night.”
One other thing that might be on that list for both the University and the joint venture is that both look to be poorly positioned to seize the opportunities offered by India as the major growth market for the UK. According to HESA data, UEA’s intake from India rose from 40 to 175 between 2016/17 and 2020/21 in a period when total Indian students in the UK rose from 16,900 to 84,555. It is a period when UEA’s enrollment of students from China fell from 1,320 to 810.
Winds of Change
The trail of INTO’s long term, joint venture model has been patchy and it has, arguably, not proved to be as responsive to university needs as the more traditional stand-alone pathway model. In the UK five operational joint ventures have closed – INTO Glasgow Caledonian University (2020), INTO St Georges University (2017), INTO University of Gloucestershire (2019), INTO UEA London (2014), and INTO Newcastle London (2020). In the US there have been closures at INTO Marshall (2019), INTO Colorado State University (2021) and INTO Washington State University (2021) as well as INTO St Louis becoming fully owned by INTO in 2021.
A recent blog noted the shift in Shorelight’s range of university relationships from joint-venture pathways oriented to direct recruitment. INTO has not been as dynamic in making that move but the shifting sands and complexities are captured in the grid below. This presumes that the University of East Anglia remains a joint venture pathway operation with the university.
| Joint Venture Pathway with University | Pathways (wholly or majority owned) | Direct Recruitment Only | Direct Admit Affiliates* | |
| US | 8 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| UK | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| Australia | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
*Described as “American universities that offer more choices to international students who seek direct admission.”
The turbulence in international student recruitment is being felt throughout the sector and pathway operations are particularly sensitive to changes impacting the relatively small number of student that require extensive language support alongside academic study skills. There are many examples of changing course portfolios, including International Year One, which reflect creative responses to new demands and developing visa scenarios to broaden the market for pathways. It may be that the continuing need for flexibility brings an end to the long-term, deeply embedded, joint-venture vision that was considered by some to be an industry game-changer.
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